This paper deals with Germany's new Africa policy. The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) presented a new Africa concept in January 2017.
Introduction
Africa is neither the continent of the future nor the continent of opportunity. 1 Most African countries are latecomers in economic development and are not rising (Kappel 2014c) , and many are poor countries that are struggling hard to make headway. The large economic articulates what should be done, without exuding a tendency towards exaggerated optimism.
The BMZ seeks to reduce poverty, develop industry, and increase employment in Africa by pursuing an approach that tackles several issues. Fundamentally, the Marshall Plan aims to 2 According to the report Dynamics of the Middle Class in Africa by the African Development Bank (AfDB 2011), people whose consumption is an average of USD 2-USD 4 per day belong to the middle class (floating class). All those who earn USD 4-USD 20 per day form the core of the new middle classes in Africa.
3 See discussion contributions on German Africa policy on the German Development Institute's (DIE) Africa
Alliances blog: online: <http://blogs.die-gdi.de/en/africaalliances/> and the blog Weltneuvermessung online:
<https://weltneuvermessung.wordpress.com/> (22 January 2017).
4 Cf. Molt 2014; Engel and Kappel 2005; Kappel 2016a Kappel , 2014a Köhler 2017; Hackenesch and Leininger 2015; Mair and Tull 2009; Nooke 2014; Klingebiel 2015; Schmidt 2015; Songwe 2014 These institutions have provided outstanding concepts for rectifying structural crises, some of which differ from those stipulated in the Marshall Plan. These include industrialisation concepts and specific proposals for the modernisation of agriculture. 6 Furthermore, the various civil society organisations, industry associations, and trade unions have contributed a multitude of ideas for African reforms.
Geostrategy versus Inclusion
It is the declared aim of the federal government to integrate the ideas of the Marshall Plan and the Compact with Africa (Schäuble 2017) into the G20 process and to advocate for a sustained and inclusive G20 strategy with Africa in Hamburg in July 2017. 7 This will constitute a 5 A benign hegemon provides reliable regulatory systems and is thus recognised as a stabilising power that makes a contribution to peace. Charles Kindleberger (1981) France is the third-largest investor on the African continent (see tables 1 and 2). Its Africa policy is still imbued with the will to pursue policies in concert with the economic and political elites of, in particular, West and Central Africa. These policies are largely driven by selfinterest. 8 The military, economic, cultural, and development-policy engagement is multifaceted -ranging from currency cooperation in the CFA zone, cultural institutions, military bases, and the deployment of troops to the presence of French companies in the commodity, industry and service sectors and in agriculture (Mehler and von Soest 2012; Thorel 2013) . China has now become Africaʹs largest trade partner. Its institutional connections to most countries have been intensified (Brautigam 2015) . In many African countries, Chinaʹs policy of "Energy for Infrastructure" has generated substantial economic growth and a multitude of China because the Peopleʹs Republic does not seek to influence internal matters and also explores new conceptual avenues -for example, rapid infrastructure development, which is financed by long-term trade and investment agreements. Chinaʹs One-Belt-One-Road strategy connects eastern and southern Africa. Concurrently, however, China is pursuing a policy of dependency and is solidifying asymmetrical structures.
The USA views Africa as a supplier of raw materials; a growing export market; and a geostrategic environment where, in particular, terrorism can be fought (Nolte, Abb, Fürtig and Kappel 2016) . Since 2014, the U.S. State Department has created a drone programme with bases in Ethiopia, Niger, Kenya, and Djibouti. From the African perspective, the USA plays an important role as, for example, the second-largest investor, the third most important trade partner (after the EU and China), and the second most important donor country for development aid. However, President Trump's government is planning to reduce such development activities in Africa. At first glance, Germanyʹs cooperation concept appears to differ from those of the states outlined above. However, upon closer inspection this proves to be a problematic assessment,
given, in particular, the postcolonial (European) trade policy, the hesitant support for infrastructure development and industrialisation, the insufficient reflection of processes of change occurring on the African continent, and the low level of sensitivity in the German valueoriented policy. As long as the EU significantly subsidises its agriculture, African farmers stand no chance in European markets, except those providing products that are not produced in Europe, such as coffee or cocoa. Additionally, the non-tariff trade barriers limit Africaʹs exports.
But this is only one side of the coin. African producers are usually unable to make use of existing market opportunities due to lacking productivity, product quality, and speed. They do not know the European, American, or Chinese markets. They have insufficient links, and even if they do have them at their disposal, their production costs are too high. If African industry and service companies want to use their export opportunities, they must become more competitive and adapt to the global level of technology. Expanding technological competence, creating a research and development sector, and increasing investment in human capital may be of help in raising labour productivity and pushing innovation, thus boosting African companies' capacity to export.
A new trade policy must consider the status quo of most African countries; in particular, it must reduce trade barriers for African exports and promote proactive marketing of African products in the EU through European-African chambers of commerce, instead of unilaterally through the creation of "Consultation Networks for German Companies in Africa" (BMZ 2017: 16) . This agenda would also conceptually counter an increasingly protectionist USA ("America first") with a cooperative strategy, contributing to the reduction of Africaʹs growing dependency on China. It is not enough to vaguely state that trade relations with Africa are to be "ambitiously driven forward" (BMZ 2017: 12 
Value-Oriented Politics and Security
Value orientation is a great challenge to the implementation of a coherent Africa policy (Mair and Tull 2009; Engel and Kappel 2005) . It is to be welcomed that the authors of the Marshall Plan have deliberately addressed this issue. However, the deliberations are not really convincing. A value-oriented policy requires clear rules. These are formulated rather vaguely in the Marshall Plan. Consistently pursuing a value-oriented policy requires criteria that enable a distinction between reform and non-reform states, and between authoritarian and demo-10 Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are constrained in many African countries. For instance, limited access to finance and electricity, a lack of managerial competencies and qualified labour, high taxes, and low barriers to market entry result in destructive imitation rather than innovation. Rwanda -which is apparently planned -runs counter to the approach of the Marshall Plan and raises doubts concerning value-oriented policies. It would be more honest for the BMZ to declare why it is that authoritarian regimes are to become privileged partners. This would make transparent why realpolitik and cooperation with authoritarian countries is necessary, since these states want to make their countries progress and modernise them with a "development state," while most frequently imitating the Chinese concept of a ʺdevelopment dictatorshipʺ (as in the case of Rwanda and Ethiopia). 11 Currently, however, it is not possible to estimate to which extent these approaches will indeed catapult people out of poverty, as many of these countries' leaders propagate. In any case, doubts are legitimate. The Marshall
Plan evades giving a reason and does not explain why the German set of values is no longer applicable to some countries and why, instead, cooperation is to be sought with Ethiopia, Mali, Algeria, Niger and Egypt, all of which are countries that violate democracy and human rights. If there is to be cooperation with these authoritarian states, then clear rules and conditions are required. Funding must be subject to the condition of clearly formulated aims for the introduction of democracy, transparency, the rule of law, and participation within a fixed time frame. If authoritarian regimes do not comply with such a deal, then development cooperation should be reduced. While cooperation with authoritarian governments should remain the exception, it is imperative to cooperate closely with democratic states that are willing to reform, thus sending a clear message.
German Investment in Africa
The BMZ's Marshall Plan wants to support German investment in Africa. But German companies do not need subsidies for their investment in Africa. Improving Hermes export credit guarantees would be completely sufficient. 12 German industry is very strong, with major and medium-sized companies from Germany investing and producing successfully worldwide.
11 Neither country can be regarded as economically successful. Thanks in large part to foreign aid, expansive public spending supported by Chinese loans, and a rise in foreign investment, Ethiopia was one of Africa's fastest growing economies during the last decade. Despite this surge, a third of Ethiopians, who now number nearly 100 million, still live on less than USD 1.90 a day.
12 See BMWi 2017 for a reform of the Hermes export credit guarantees and several ideas for new instruments in order to strengthen German investment and partnerships with African institutions; BDI and DIHK 2017 for a detailed list of the demands of German industry. It is interesting to observe that an expert report for the BMZ by Felbermayr and Yalcin (2016) can do entirely without knowledge of the developments in Africa. Here, support measures that have been very familiar for a long time have been reissued.
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There are good reasons why German companies (some 1,000) exercise some reserve in Africa.
African markets are small, many countries are politically unstable (which is very bad for investment), and the risks are generally very high. When the globally leading German companies see growth potential, they will invest. Windfall effects are to be avoided.
Different Concepts for Different Groups of Countries
Germany needs a new approach to cooperation with Africa. This is the message of the Mar- 3. Commodity-rich countries have phases of strong growth, yet also have high unemployment and corruption, and in phases of slumping markets they easily fall into the debt trap. For commodity-rich countries, the priority must be supporting anti-corruptioncampaigns and the diversification of raw material economies.
4. Small countries -that is, the majority of African states -can be best supported via measures for regional integration, the further development of intra-regional infrastructure, and the strengthening of regional organisations. By financing investment in infrastructure, Germany can contribute to cross-border market integration.
5. Cooperation with stagnating countries, whose transition into the service sector is often connected to lower productivity , has a different dimension. These counties often remain in the trap of low productivity. Therefore, most have extreme difficulty creating employment (Bass, Kappel and Wohlmuth 2017) , as characterised by rural unemployment and informality in the cities, where the informal sector is the dominant economy. The sector of medium-sized companies is usually small and embedded in major foreign and domestic corporations (ICT, banks, wholesalers); the frequently dominant commodity/raw materials sector, which only provides work for very few wage-earning workers (Bhorat and Tarp 2016; Kappel, Pfeiffer and Reisen 2017) ; the export-oriented consumer goods sectors; and modern agriculture. It is apparently very difficult to alter this heterogenic structure, even more so given the fact that severe impediments to the development of entrepreneurship exist in many countries. Contributing here with flexible and adapted agendas to ensure that at least some African countries can see industrial development and a solution to the severe problems in the field of employment, particularly for the youth, is a task which would merit discussion. Many countries remain in the poverty trap, and several countries which are beset by political unrest will continue to be characterised by crises and conflicts in the long term. The profound change on the continent offers opportunities to the people when the governments and the external actors are willing to implement reforms. Germanyʹs Africa policy could make a contribution and support the African transformation process. Within Europe, Germany will become an important actor that can provide impulses for cooperation with Africa, as it largely aims for a non-hegemonic, inclusive, centripetal and reliable partnership, which distinguishes it from the G20 member states pursuing geostrategic interests.
Institutional reform is imperative in order to create a more efficient and coherent Africa policy and in order to reduce friction losses. The (friction) costs caused by the multitude of ministerial coordination processes can be reduced. Germanyʹs Africa policy could thus also make more effective use of its distinctive competencies and could bring about a strategy of togetherness with the reform-active and democratic states of Africa. It would stand out positively from the postcolonial agendas of others and could thus be the blueprint for a civilpower-oriented and inclusive model.
It is the responsibility of the Federal Foreign Office to coordinate and implement Germanyʹs Africa policy, because Africa will only make progress if there is peace in Africa. Germany can provide impulses in Africa with its civil-power concept, strengthening reform-oriented countries, but it must also allocate adequate funding and include the Ministry of Defence. Germany's Africa policy is thus the task of the entire federal government.
